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IMPERFECT COMPETITION
IN THE WORLD OIL MARKET:
A COMPUTERIZED NASH-COURNOT MODEL
STEPHEN W. SALANT
Lexington, Mass. and Toronto, Lexington Books, 1982. Pp. 170 + xx
THE IMPACT OF OIL IMPORT PRICE SHOCKS
ON DOMESTIC PRICES
ROBERT A. FELDMAN
Boulder, Westview Press, 1982. Pp. 189 + xiii
These two books are aptly reviewed together: they have a great deal
in common. Both are concerned with a problem relating to the world oil
market and pricing by OPEC. Both are relatively short monographs, with
most of their space given to technical details of model construction and
results. Both are addressed to the professional economist or advanced
economics student with extensive quantitative training. The first forecasts
rising real oil prices through the year 2050; the second estimates the
effects of the sharp rise in oil prices of 1973-74 on the product prices of
numerous industries in the United States.
The sub-title of the first book, by Salant, is most important. The book
is not concerned with whether there is imperfect competition in the world
oil market, but rather with the properties and output of a model, based
on game-theoretic principles, that can properly deal with imperfect com-
petition. Chapter 1 consists of a short overview of the model. Chapter 2
reports the results of hypothetical forecasts of the model and estimates
of sensitivity of results to changes in assumptions regarding market struc-
ture, interest rates, demand elasticities and other parameters. Chapters 3
and 4, which together with their appendices make up the bulk of the
book, provide highly technical discussions of the conditions that must be
satisfied simultaneously in forecasts by the model and of the computer
strategy used to solve the system of conditions. Chapter 5 is concerned
with limitations and possible extensions of the model. There is a lucid
and sympathetic foreword written by Darius Gaskins.
A major contribution of the book lies in its treatment of the standard
assumption that firms attempt to maximize profits. First, it is explicitly
recognized that the profit opportunities of the imperfectly competitive
firm are affected by the current decisions of other firms as well as by
future market conditions. Second, agents are assumed to have some de-
gree of foresight and to respond to such diverse prospects as expropriation
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or a quadrupling of oil prices. The first point is generally recognized in
the profession, but debate exists over how noncompetitive firms forecast
the initiating and responsive behavior of rival firms. The second point is
significant in view of the fact, pointed out by the author, that numerous
contributors to the literature assume no foresight whatsoever.
For purposes of forecasting the trajectory of future oil prices, Salant
assumes a base case in which key parameters include 0.75 income elas-
ticity of demand, -0.5 price elasticity of demand, 2.0 percent annual
demand growth, 1,306 billion barrel-equivalent of oil and gas resources
and a 2.0 percent real after-tax riskless rate of interest. In the base case
the world oil price is projected to rise from about $22 per barrel (1979
dollars) in 1980 to slightly more than $50 per barrel (1979 dollars) in
2050. In comparison with the base case, the assumption of full monopoly
in the world market raises the world price through 2030 and lowers it
slightly thereafter. The assumption of lower price elasticity predictably
raises the world price throughout the period. A lower interest rate raises
prices through 2020 as it encourages a shift of production from "present"
to "future." Finally, the assumption of the unavailability of heavy oil
resources raises the world price throughout the period, as one would
expect. In short the model predicts in a qualitative sense what standard
economic theory predicts. In this, it passes a major test.
Gaskins observes (p. xvi) that "the model tends to underpredict the
oil-price path observed since 1973, suggesting that it fails to capture or
characterize accurately all of the behavioral attributes of the producing
entities." Nonetheless, he concludes, the model "fares well" under the
tests of capturing "enough of the significant attributes of the market to
make workably accurate estimates" and permitting "the systematic in-
vestigation of significant variables."
The second book, by Feldman, investigates the effect on individual
product prices of the oil shock of 1973-74, using the input-output scheme
of relationships among industries. This scheme enables him to trace out
indirect as well as direct effects on supply and demand in the affected
industries. After a brief introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 provides a
technical discussion of the analytical framework, the fixed-coefficient
input-output technology. Chapter 3 gives a compilation of estimated do-
mestic price effects, using the fixed-coefficient model. Chapter 4 enlarges
the analytical framework to allow for interfuel substitution; and Chapter
5 reports the price effects estimated in the expanded framework. Chapter
6 is the concluding chapter.
The domestic price effects are given in terms of percentage changes
under six different basic assumptions. Two of these have to do with macro
policy assumed, "macro 1" assuming that domestic spending remains
constant and "macro 2" assuming that domestic output is held constant.
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"Natural gas I" assumes no change in the price of natural gas, while
"natural gas 2" assumes price change proportional to imported oil price
change. The assumptions "finite" and "infinite" refer to domestic supply
elasticities. Effects are also reported with and without price controls.
The results indicate that most domestic prices rose as a consequence
of the oil shock. In general, the increases were larger when output was
assumed held constant (macro 2), when domestic supply elasticities were
assumed finite, and when gas prices were assumed to rise with oil prices.
There were some surprises, however, resulting from indirect effects, in-
cluding exchange rate effects in the international sector. One significant
surprise was how little price controls held down price increases.
Also surprising was the fact that interfuel substitution had little effect
in holding down prices on average, although it did affect the distribution
of price changes among industries. These results suggest highly inelastic
short-run supplies of substitute fuels and great variation among industries
of substitution opportunities.
This reviewer was bothered by the author's failure to reconcile his
results with standard macro and micro theory. The letter says that, from
one equilibrium to another, a rise in oil prices should have altered relative
prices, but not the general price level so long as aggregate spending
remains constant. Feldman's results show considerable change in relative
prices, but they also suggest a rise in the general price level even when
aggregate spending is held constant (macro 1). This result is consistent
with a temporary fall in aggregate output, but it is not a result that one
would expect to appear in a new equilibrium. Which raises the question,
how long a time is assumed to elapse between the oil shock and Feldman's
results? Are we assuming a period of time long enough to restore general
equilibrium? Do the results reflect short-run disequilibrium?
Despite these doubts and questions, it is clear that Feldman has made
an important contribution to our understanding of the relative price effects
of the oil shock of 1973-74. Particularly through his tracing out indirect
effects, including those in the international sector, he has revealed the
complexity of those effects and suggested the host of adjustments in output
and resource employment associated with them. He has indicated some
of the valuable things that can be done using input-output technology.
Both of these are significant books reflecting advanced analytical work.
They are specialized, technical books, however, and not for the general
reader.
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